Microeconomic Models of Credit Contracting: Debt Renegotiation, Government Interventions and Optimal Contracting - Karel Janda - Books - LAP Lambert Academic Publishing - 9783838310732 - May 21, 2010
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Microeconomic Models of Credit Contracting: Debt Renegotiation, Government Interventions and Optimal Contracting


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This book deals with the problems of optimal financial contracting under asymmetric information. The chapters 2 and 3 are motivated by the problems faced by entrepreneurs and investors in the economics in transition. These two chapters take the debt form of the financial contract as given and analyze the problems of renegotiation and government credit support. The chapter 4 is devoted to the derivation and characterization of optimal financial contracts for financing investment projects with absolute priority violation. This chapter models the situation of ex post asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and lenders.

Media Books     Paperback Book   (Book with soft cover and glued back)
Released May 21, 2010
ISBN13 9783838310732
Publishers LAP Lambert Academic Publishing
Pages 132
Dimensions 225 × 8 × 150 mm   ·   215 g
Language German