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Microeconomic Models of Credit Contracting: Debt Renegotiation, Government Interventions and Optimal Contracting Karel Janda
Microeconomic Models of Credit Contracting: Debt Renegotiation, Government Interventions and Optimal Contracting
Karel Janda
This book deals with the problems of optimal financial contracting under asymmetric information. The chapters 2 and 3 are motivated by the problems faced by entrepreneurs and investors in the economics in transition. These two chapters take the debt form of the financial contract as given and analyze the problems of renegotiation and government credit support. The chapter 4 is devoted to the derivation and characterization of optimal financial contracts for financing investment projects with absolute priority violation. This chapter models the situation of ex post asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and lenders.
| Media | Books Paperback Book (Book with soft cover and glued back) |
| Released | May 21, 2010 |
| ISBN13 | 9783838310732 |
| Publishers | LAP Lambert Academic Publishing |
| Pages | 132 |
| Dimensions | 225 × 8 × 150 mm · 215 g |
| Language | German |
See all of Karel Janda ( e.g. Paperback Book )