William A Speier

Operational Art Considerations for Army Air and Missile Defense: Lessons from the October War William A Speier

The purpose of this monograph is to determine whether or not Army air and missile defense planning and employment--air and missile defense design--has an operational art cognitive foundation. It combines the theory of operational art with a case study analysis of the 1973 Arab Israeli War and an assessment of current air and missile defense doctrine to answer this thesis question. Systems theory is the foundation of operational art. Therefore, the U. S. Army air and missile defense system merits are established first using complex adaptive systems evaluation criteria. An evaluation operational art theory and current joint and service operational doctrine establishes the operational art criteria. The operational design methodology provided within current joint and service doctrine forms the basis of these criteria. A case study of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War provides specific historical air and missile operational art lessons. Current joint and service air and missile defense doctrine is evaluated using lessons from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the operational design criteria. The final assessment is that current air and missile defense doctrine lacks operational art cognition and risk repeating Egypt's mistakes from the 1973 war.