Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy - Cowie, Christopher (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Durham) - Books - Oxford University Press - 9780198842736 - October 23, 2019
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Cowie, Christopher (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Durham)
Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

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Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This troubling view is known as the moral error theory. Christopher Cowie defends it against the most compelling counter-argument, the argument from analogy: Cowie shows that moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments.

256 pages

Media Books     Hardcover Book   (Book with hard spine and cover)
Released October 23, 2019
ISBN13 9780198842736
Publishers Oxford University Press
Pages 246
Dimensions 222 × 144 × 23 mm   ·   430 g
Language English  

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